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The very impulse, noticeable in many life species including human beings to be in a communityor a collective can itself be described as a natural economic activity in as much as such anactivity contributes to flourishing and avoids sufferings.
There is a deep connection between the impulse to be in a community and the need for a political constitution. The differences in utilities that may be derived by individual action and those by collective action are fundamental to any study of collective organization. It may therefore seem appealing to talk about logical economic rationalization to explain the emergence of democracy and the accompanying democratic political institutions. Economists talk about as to how individual utility may be increased by collective action in two distinct ways. By collective action, some of the external costs that may come to be imposed by the private action of other individuals may be eliminated.
R Venkataramani (2025) "Interconnectedness between Economic Theories and Legal Practices", GNLU Journal of Law And Economics : Volume VII 2024, Issue I
Available at:
https://gnlu.ac.in/GJLE/Publications/Interconnectedness between Economic Theories and Legal Practices
The essay examines the violence that unfurled in Bangladesh in 2024 from the lens of the relativedeprivation theory to explain the role of perceived inequality in political violence, and the prospecttheory to explain the role of prospect losses as a motivation for individuals to participate inpolitical violence. The essay analyses the events that acted as a trigger for the social unrest andfocuses on the contentious quota to explain the decisionmaking process of the players involved,from the viewpoint of the prospect theory. The essay also looks at macroeconomic variables suchas youth unemployment, inflation etc. during both the years that marked a social unrest among thegeneral population and found that in both years, the economy had shown worrying trends. Theessay also looks at the role of costs and benefits as perceived by an individual while making achoice in a risky situation. The conceptual framework is further demonstrated by a game wherethe decisionmaking process of the government, as a player, is discussed. It is found that theequilibrium for both the players is at the first outcome, where the participation is met withsuppression by the government. The most ideal outcome for both the parties is a peaceful approachto the issue at hand. Based on the existing research, and the game theory, policy recommendationshave been formulated emphasizing the need for a stronger penal system, to augment the costs thatare associated with participation in violence, and to make infrastructural developments to addressthe socioeconomic issues at hand. The establishment of transparent communication channelswould also go a long way in mitigating the risks of future unrest.